As the popularity of tactical asset allocation and using market valuation to inform investment decisions rises, so too do the criticisms to such methodologies. In the long run, this is part of a healthy dialogue that shapes the ongoing evolution of how we invest. But much of the recent criticism to being tactical in particular seems to suggest that if we can't get the timing exactly right, or calculate a valuation that works precisely to predict returns in all environments, that it should be rejected. In reality, though, even just participating in a few booms, or avoiding a handle of extreme busts, can still create significant long-term benefits for achieving client goals. Which raises the question - if we're really focused on the long term for clients, are we expecting too much from market valuation in the short term?Read More...
In the midst of volatile, ambiguous, and uncertain markets, it’s often difficult to know what to do. In such a high stakes environment, we look for any clues that we can find, to figure out whether what we’re doing is “right” or not. Unfortunately, though, this can lead to trouble, as research shows that the methods and tools our brains use to make decisions are not always rational. For instance, sometimes we look to what others around us are doing, to determine whether our own actions are appropriate or not, rather than doing our own due diligence. In many situations, this form of “social proof” can be an effective means to fit into society. In other situations, though, it can potentially lead to herd behavior. Which raises the question – to what extent are our investment decisions as planners influenced by what other planners are doing, instead of our own due diligence?
A common complaint about the use of tactical asset allocation strategies - which vary exposure to bonds, equities, and other asset classes over time - is that they are "risky" to the client's long-term success. What happens if you reduce exposure to equities and you are wrong, and the market goes up further? Are you gambling your client's long-term success?
Yet at the same time, the principles of market valuation are clear: an overvalued market eventually falls in line, and like a rubber band, the worse it's stretched, the more volatile the snapback tends to be. Which means an overvalued market that goes up just generates an even more inferior return thereafter. However, greedy clients may not always be so patient; there's a risk that the planner may get fired before valuation proves the results right.
Which raises the question: is NOT reducing equity exposure in overvalued markets about managing the CLIENT'S risk, or the PLANNER'S?Read More...
A common debate in the financial planning world is what we can do to make clients less focused on the short-term volatility of the markets. As the viewpoint goes, if we can help clients to pay less attention to the markets, they won't be so stressed in times of turmoil and will be less likely to make rash, impulsive decisions like bailing out in the midst of a downturn.
Accordingly, one common conclusion is that as planners, we should send statements to clients less often; after all, if we don't want clients to look at the markets so much, why do we keep sending them so many reports about what's going on in their portfolio?
Yet a recent new service for advisors, that in part provides even more regular reporting for clients, is discovering that the opposite may be true: that in fact, the best way to calm clients is not less reporting and information, it's more... as long as it's clear and relevant and puts the situation in context. Read More...
In the ongoing search for more diversification - and especially, low correlations as a potential for stabilizing returns in a difficult stock environment - advisors have increasingly shifted in recent years towards "alternative" investments. From real estate and REITs to gold and other commodities to more, a recent FPA survey on Alternative Investments found that 91% of advisors are using some form of alternative investments. Sadly, though, the focus on finding investments that have a low correlation - according to FPA's survey, the number one criteria for choosing an alternative investment - has grown to such an obsession, that we're willing to name anything that has a low correlation as "a new asset class." But the reality is that while some alternatives really are investments that truly have their own investment characteristics unique from stocks and bonds as asset classes, others alternatives - like managed futures - simply represent an active manager buying and selling existing asset classes. Which means it's about time for us to start distinguishing between a real alternative asset classes (e.g., commodities or real estate), and the real value of managed futures.
Diversification is a fundamental principle of investing - examples of the concept date back as far as Talmudic texts estimated to have been written over 3,000 years ago, stating "Let every man divide his money into three parts, and invest a third in land, a third in business and a third let him keep by him in reserve." The diversification principle received a further boost in the recent era when Harry Markowitz's Modern Portfolio Theory supported the notion that the volatility of a portfolio may be less than the volatility of its parts, such that the introduction of even a high-return high-risk asset to the portfolio may improve the portfolio's risk-adjusted return (or even outright reduce its volatility). Yet at the same time, both the rabbis of the Talmud and Markowitz would probably agree that the first step of investing your assets is even more basic: make sure you own stuff that has a reasonable expectation of providing a useful return in the first place. Unfortunately, though, we seem to have lost sight of this rule in recent years!Read More...
Investors in the U.S. have become increasingly numb to the reality of investing here - a world where stocks pay a dividend barely over 2%, and short-term bonds or CDs give a yield barely more than 0%. Accordingly, we have few options for return aside from investing in risk-based assets to seek - or at least, hope for - capital appreciation. Yet the ultra-low returns on everything in the U.S. - necessitating a significant amount of appreciation just to generate a reasonable total return - is not the norm for U.S. investing historically, nor even currently around the world outside of the U.S., as I was reminded during my recent trip to Australia. In fact, I was somewhat shocked while I was there to wonder: how would investing in the U.S. be different if we, too, could get local short-term bank CDs that paid nearly 6%!?Read More...
Psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky won the Nobel prize in economics for developing a theoretical framework to show how we make often irrational decisions when faced with real life economic trade-offs. As a part of their prospect theory research, they showed that we are naturally loss averse; this means we experience more negative feelings associated with a loss, than we do positive feelings for a comparable gain. For instance, we feel worse about losing $100, than we feel happy for winning $100. Yet despite the recognition that this research has received, are we ignoring it in the financial planning world? Simply put: If our clients feel worse about a loss than they feel good about a comparable gain, shouldn't we be more proactive about protecting them from losses, even at the risk of giving up more gains?Read More...
The prevailing wisdom in financial planning is that clients should stay the course... always. It's "never" appropriate for clients to get out of stocks (even a little bit), and the eternal chiding to any so-called market timer is that even if you can figure out when to get out, you'll never figure out when to get back in again, and you'll miss any rally that might follow a market decline. But does this miss the point? If you actually sell BEFORE a severe market decline (as opposed to after), you don't even NEED to get back in until the market recovers anyway!Read More...
Unless you manage to purchase an index fund that produces zero tracking error, at some point the investments you own will deviate from their associated benchmark. Whether it's the tracking error of an index fund, or the relative under- or out-performance of an active fund manager, returns can vary over time. And while most of us don't fret over small deviations from a benchmark - nor do we mind when the deviation is due to outperformance! - but at some point, a fund may underperform its relevant benchmark by enough, and for a long enough period of time, that you have to question whether it's time for a change. But the caveat is... what IS a big enough underperformance deviation, and how long must it persist, before you actually do decide to make a change? What is the best practice for deciding when a fund has lost its Mojo?
